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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1348 
___________ 
 
GRAHAM TOMLINSON, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A017-514-987) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2013 
Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 3, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Graham Tomlinson petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA” or “Board”) dismissal of his appeal.  For the following reasons, we will dismiss 
in part and deny in part the petition for review. 
I. 
 Tomlinson, a citizen of the United Kingdom, was admitted to the United States as 
a lawful permanent resident in 1967.  In 2003, he was convicted of first-degree burglary, 
in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502, and sentenced to 16 to 48 months’ incarceration.  
Tomlinson was later served with a Notice to Appear charging him with being removable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction as 
defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(G). 
 At a hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Tomlinson, through an attorney, 
conceded removability.  The IJ determined that he was ineligible for relief because of his 
conviction for an aggravated felony and ordered him removed to the United Kingdom.  
Tomlinson’s lawyer indicated that he would be requesting discretionary relief based upon 
hardship and that he wished to pursue post-conviction relief under Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356 (2010).  The IJ denied a continuance for either purpose. 
 On appeal to the BIA, Tomlinson challenged the denial of a continuance and 
requested a remand because he was challenging his conviction in state court.  The BIA 
dismissed his appeal, concluding that the IJ appropriately determined that Tomlinson had 
not demonstrated good cause to grant a continuance.  This petition for review followed. 
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II. 
 Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien, 
like Tomlinson, who is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  We retain jurisdiction, however, to review any constitutional or 
legal questions raised in his petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Cruz v. 
Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2006).  We exercise plenary review over the 
BIA’s legal determinations.  See Santos-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 660 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
III. 
Tomlinson has not presented any viable claims.  First, cannot collaterally attack 
his conviction in removal proceedings.  See Drakes v. I.N.S., 330 F.3d 600, 601 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Tomlinson further argues that his Fifth Amendment right to due process was 
violated because of ineffective assistance of counsel during his hearing before the IJ.  
However, this argument was not raised before the BIA and is therefore unexhausted.  We 
lack jurisdiction to review unexhausted arguments, see Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 
F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003), and Tomlinson must file a motion to reopen with the 
Board to exhaust such an argument, see Zheng v. Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 98, 107-08 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 Tomlinson appears to claim that the IJ violated his due process rights by denying 
his request for a continuance to pursue post-conviction relief in state court.  The 
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Government asserts that we lack jurisdiction over this argument.  We have not yet 
decided in a precedential opinion whether a garden-variety claim of the denial of a 
continuance is reviewable in the case of a criminal alien; at least two other courts of 
appeals have suggested that they are not.  See, e.g., Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 
1284-85 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[P]etitioner also argues the IJ and BIA erred in denying his 
request to continue the removal proceedings until his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
was resolved in state court. . . . This challenge raises neither a constitutional nor a legal 
issue, so we are without jurisdiction to review it.”); Ogunfuye v. Holder, 610 F.3d 303, 
307 (5th Cir. 2010).  We have suggested that, in an appropriate circumstance, a denial of 
a continuance could violate due process.  See Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  This denial did not.  Notably, Tomlinson’s conviction remains final for 
immigration purposes despite any pending collateral attack.  Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 
F.3d 196, 198-90 (3d Cir. 2008); cf. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 
(2013) (holding that Padilla is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). 
 Tomlinson also appears to challenge the IJ’s denial of a continuance to allow him 
to seek hardship relief.  The record does not contain any indication that Tomlinson 
actually sought hardship relief.  He certainly has not made out any due process violation.  
See Hoxha, 559 F.3d at 163 n.5.  In any event, we note that we lack jurisdiction to 
consider such a discretionary decision, including any “exceptional and extremely 
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unusual” hardship determination.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Att’y Gen., 
619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review in part, to the 
extent we lack jurisdiction, and deny it in part. 
